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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

EMILIO ORTIZ,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 8705727-CA
vs.
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION
(SELF-INSURED) and SECOND
INJURY FUND,

Priority No. 6

Defendants/Respondents
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF/
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW OF ORDER
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSHON OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I. Whether this court should give rtiaximum d e f e r e n c e t o
the Industrial Commission's findings sincje substantial evidence
supports the Industrial Commission's det e^rmination that Ortiz'
current disability is not due to an indust rial accident?
II. Whether the Industrial Commissi on properly denied
Ortiz a hearing on objections to the Medilcal Panel Report?
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III. Whether the Odd-Lot Doctrine is irrelevant to this
appeal since the Industrial Commission never reached the issue
of permanent total disability because Ortiz had no present
disability arising out of any industrial accident?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The determinative statute is the 1982 amendment to Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (Supp. 1987), a copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum "A."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:

Ortiz claims permanent total disability benefits under the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition by the
Industrial Commission:

1.

On April 9, 1980, the Industrial Commission of Utah

("Commission") entered its Order, awarding plaintiff Emilio
Ortiz ("Ortiz") workers' compensation benefits arising out of
an industrial accident which occurred on February 19, 1976.
(R. at 172-181.)
2.

On October 30, 1984, Ortiz filed an application for

permanent total disability which he alleges arose out of his
February 19, 1976 industrial accident. (R. at 204.)
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3.

On December 18, 1984, a medical panel was appointed to

evaluate the medical aspects of the Orti |z claim for permanent
total disability. (R. at 444.)
4.

On January 28, 1986, the Medica 1 Panel issued its

Report, concluding that Ortiz failed to demonstrate any significant progression of his industrial back disability since
1976.
5.

(R. at 449-52.)

See Addendum "B.

On March 7, 1986, Ortiz filed ob]jections to ~he

Medical Panel Report and requested a medti cal panel hearing and
rehabilitation evaluation.
6.

(R. at 453- 54 .)

On March 24, 1986, Administrat ive Law Judge Timothy C,

Allen issued his Findings of Fact and Cone lusions of Law and
Order, denying Ortiz' request and cone:luding that Ortiz' claim
for permanent total disability did not at ise from the
February 19, 1976 industrial accident.

(R. at 456-59.)

See

Addendum "C."
7.

On April 18, 1986, Ortiz filed a Motion for Review,

contending that he was entitled to a med Jical panel hearing on
his objections to the Medical Panel Repo t.
8.

(R. at 465-71.)

The Industrial Commission deni.ed Ortiz' Motion for

Review on June 19, 1986, concluding that no further hearing on
his application for permanent total dis>ab ility benefits was
necessary.
9.

(R. at 472-74.)

See Addendurh "D."

On November 25, 1987, Ortiz fi ltd a Notice of Appeal

and/or Motion and Memorandum in support
-3-

f Motion to Reopen

and/or Reconsider the Commission Order.

(R. at 497-500 and

502.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts contained in the Brief of Appellant
is incomplete and misleading.
unsupported statements.
Corporation

Ortiz also cites as "fact"

Accordingly, Kennecott Copper

("Kennecott") submits the following statement of

facts to supplement and clarify the record:
1.

On February 19, 1976, Ortiz was injured in the course

of his employment with Kennecott, suffering an injury to his
back while lifting a railroad tie weighing about 100 pounds.
(R. at 21-23 and 173.)
2.

Ortiz was awarded permanent partial disability bene-

fits for the 1976 industrial accident.

The permanent partial

impairment attributable to Ortiz' pre-existing back degeneration and a spinal fusion was found to be 20% (R. at 450.)
However, the Medical Panel concluded that the permanent partial
impairment attributable to the February 19, 1976 industrial
accident was only 2%.
3.

(R. at 450.)

In 1980, Administrative Law Judge, Joseph C. Foley

awarded Ortiz a 5% disability rating for his 1976 industrial
accident, which only differed 5% from the impairment that Ortiz
claimed resulted from the 1976 industrial accident.
177, 449, 452 and 494.)
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(R. at

4.

Numerous physicians concluded tl[iat Ortiz did not

suffer any impairment from his 1976 industrial accident. Dr.
Hargreaves gave Ortiz a "0 rating as far as any industrial
permanent physical impairment."

(R. at 449.)

Dr. Jeff

Rohlfing did not give Ortiz an increased percentage of disability due to his employment.

(R. at 4^0.)

In 1986, Drs.

McEntire and Millet concluded from their examination of Ortiz
that his industrial disability has not increased since 1979
(R. at 452.) Dr. Boyd Holbrook agreed with McEntire and
Millet's examination results and felt no need to change the
opinion or the rating.
5.

(R. at 450.)

Since 1951, Ortiz has suffered Numerous non-employment

related back injuries, including:
(a)

a slip and fall in 1951 (R| at 34);

(b)

an automobile accident in 1957 (R. at 36);

(c)

an excavation injury in 19^7 (R. at 37);

(d)

a strain in 1958 (R. at 37;

(e)

a slip and fall in 1961 (R| at 37);

(f) numerous other back injuries between 1961 and
1969 (R. at 38-39);
(g) many injuries caused by exertion in moving cars
(R. at 38, 39);
(h)

a fall in 1969 (R. at 39); and

(i)

automobile accidents occurring between 1970 and

1975, one of which was a hit and run accident in which Ortiz
was hit by a car.

(R. at 39-41.)
-5-

6.

Ortiz returned to work at Kennecott from his 1976

industrial accident on May 7, 1979.

He continued working at

Kennecott from May 7, 1979 until he was injured in a nonemployment automobile accident on April 3, 1983.

(R. at 232

and 264.)
7.

On April 3, 1983, while driving to work, Ortiz* car

spun three or four times on black ice and skidded into a
ditch.

As a result of this accident, Ortiz underwent hospital-

ization, medical treatment and therapy for serious back
injuries.
8.

(R. 250-53, and 450.)

On May 20, 1983 Ortiz was involved in another

automobile accident.

A car behind him failed to stop and

rear-ended the vehicle which Ortiz was driving.

Ortiz was

hospitalized again and received additional medical treatment
and therapy for back injuries.
9.

(R. at 253-56, and 450.)

Although Ortiz characterizes the 1983 automobile

accidents as being "relatively minor" (Appellant's brief at p.
4.) Ortiz previously described the accidents as being "serious
in nature" (R. at 418 and 473-74).

Both accidents required

hospitalization.

Since these automobile

(R. at 251-256.)

accidents, Ortiz has not returned to work.
10.

(R. at 232 and 264.)

The reason that Ortiz stopped reporting to work on

April 7, 1983 was because of back injuries sustained in the
1983 car accidents.

(R. at 264.)
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11.

On July 17, 1984, Ortiz filed an application with the

Industrial Commission, seeking permanent total disability,
allegedly arising out of the industrial accident of
February 19, 1976.
12.

(R. at 204.)

Kennecott denied Ortiz' claim oh November 19, 1984,

contending that any current disability resulted from the 1983
automobile accidents.
13.

(R. at 206-07.)

Although Ortiz states that his medical expert's

testimony substantiates the claim that Ortiz is "permanently
and totally disabled primarily due to his industrial accident,"
(Appellant's brief at p. 8, 1f 8), the Record fails to support
such contention.
14.

The portions of the Record relifed upon by Ortiz to

establish permanent and total disability simply reiterate the
percentages of impairment suffered by Mr. Ortiz in 1976 and
speculate about what might have occurred if Ortiz had not had
the 1983 automobile accidents.
15.

(R. at 4p6-59; and 472-73.)

The Record does not contain any statement by Dr.

Hebertson that Ortiz is permanently and totally disabled
"primarily due tc any industrial accident."

(R. at 273-276.)

Rather, the record demonstrates that eveji Dr. Hebertson, Ortiz'
treating physician, felt that Ortiz' current disability was a
result of the 1983 automobile accidents
16.

(R. at 459.)

On February 20, 1986, the medickl aspects of Ortiz'

claim for permanent total disability werp referred to a Medical
Panel.

(R. 448.)
-7-

17.

On January 28, 1986, the Medical Panel issued their

report; aicknowledging that they had considered the opinion and
medical records of Dr. Hebertson.

The Medical Panel Report

concluded that:
(A) Ortiz failed to demonstrate by objective physical findings or x-ray findings any
significant progression of his 1976 industrial
injury;
(B) Ortiz has not been temporarily and
totally disabled as a result of the 1976
industrial injury since May 6, 1979 when he
returned to work; and
(C) Ortiz' automobile accidents did not
have any relation to his industrial injury and
his industrial disability has not increased since
1979.
(R. at 449-52, 473.)
18.

Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen adopted the

findings of the Medical Panel and concluded that the
preponderance of medical evidence supports the Medical Panel's
finding that Ortiz' current disability is not due to the 1976
industrial accident.
19.
sion.

(R. at 459.)

The Industrial Commission upheld Judge Allen's deciThey concluded that there was little if any conflict

between the opinions of Dr. Hebertson and the Medical Panel and
that the evidence did not support a finding that any present
disability resulted from the 1976 industrial accident.
472-75.)
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(R. at

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court will not disturb the findings and orders of the
Industrial Commission unless they are arbitrary, capricious and
contrary to the evidence.
P.2d 109, 110 (Utah 1986).

See Rushton vj. Gelco Express, 732
Because substantial evidence

demonstrates that Ortiz' current disability did not result from
any industrial accident, the Commission'^ findings and Order
should not be displaced.
Because there is no substantial confjLict or lack or clarity
in the evidence in the instant case, no Rearing on objections
to the Medical Panel Report is necessary!

Thus, the 1982

procedural amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 governs the
instant application for workers' compensation benefits and
relieves the Commission of the burdensom^ obligation of
conducting unnecessary hearings.
Because Ortiz' present disability, d:j.d not result from any
industrial accident, the application of tphe Odd-Lot Doctrine is
not an issue properly before this Court
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS SHOULD
NOT BE DISPLACED.
The Utah Supreme Court explained the appropriate standard
for review of Industrial Commission case^ in Blaine v.
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Industrial Commission, 700 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1985),
concluding that "the Commission's findings are not to be
displaced in the absence of a showing that they are arbitrary
and capricious."

In Blaine, the Supreme Court referred to the

prior case of Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888
(Utah 1981), declaring that:
[I]t is apparent that this Court's function in
reviewing Commission findings of fact is a strictly
limited one in which the question is not whether the
Court agrees with the Commission's findings or whether
they are supported by a preponderance of evidence.
Instead, the reviewing Court's inquiry is whether the
Commission's findings are "arbitrary or capricious,"
or "wholly without cause," or contrary to the "one
[inevitable] conclusion from the evidence," or without
"any substantial evidence" to support them. Only then
should the Commission's findings be displaced.
(Citations omitted.)
Id. at 890. Accordingly, this Court "give[s] maximum deference
to the basic facts determined by the agency, which will be
sustained if there is evidence of any substance that can be
reasonably regarded as supporting the determination made."
(Emphasis added.)

Wilson v. Industrial Commission, 73 5 P. 2d

403, 403 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Allen & Assoc, v. Industrial
Commission, 732 P.2d 508-509 (Utah 1987)).
A.

The Evidence Amply Supports The Industrial
Commission's Findings.

Although Ortiz suffered an industrial accident in 1976, the
evidence amply demonstrates that any present disability is not
a result of his 1976 industrial accident.
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In reviewing Ortiz' back condition and related claims for
permanent total disability, the Medical Panel noted that
numerous physicians gave Ortiz a 0 ratinb for permanent
physical impairment due to his employment.

(R. at 449-50).

Nevertheless, the Medical Panel gave Ortjiz a 2% rating for
impairment attributable to his 1976 industrial accident.
at 450.)

(R.

The Administrative Law Judge cpmpromised the dispute,

giving Ortiz a 5% rating of impairment attributable to the 1976
industrial accident.

(R. at 452.)

In 1986 the Medical Panel concluded that Ortiz had not
suffered any additional industrial impairment.
458-59 and 473.)

(R. at 452,

Although the Medical Panel considered the

opinions of Dr. Hebertson, the Panel concluded that:
This patient has failed to demonstrate by objective
physical findings or roentgenograph^ findings any
significant progression of his disease since 1976 with
exception of the spinal fusion which
mentioned. We are aware that the industrial commission has settled on a permanent physical impairment of
25% of the whole person and attributed 5% of that to
the industrial injury. It is this panel's opinion
that those determinations are unchanged by our examination. We specifically have not in opinion increased
his disability from 2 to 5% but are aware that has
already occurred and feel that it has been no change
from the determinations already made
(Emphasis
added.)
(R. at 452.)
Administrative Law Judge, Timothy C. Allen determined that
because the medical panel had been fully apprised of the
opinions of Ortiz'

treating Physician, Dr. Hebertson, no legitimate purpose would
be served by conducting a hearing which would only prolong the
proceedings, especially when "this case involves the classic
situation where reasonable medical minds can and do differ."
(R. at 456.)

Judge Allen carefully considered the evidence and

opinions offered by Dr. Hebertson, particularly a May 31, 1984
letter from Dr. Hebertson, which states:
Mr. Ortiz' current disability dates from the accident
of April 6, 1983. He had not been able to work since
that time. The condition was further aggravated by
the accident of May 20, 1983. Both accidents were
superimposed on a prior industrial accident in 1976.
I think his original industrial condition was gradually getting worse. It would probably have been
necessary for him to retire at some point, but the
accident of last Spring did speed up this process.
(R. at 458-59.)
From these statements, Judge Allen properly determined that
even Dr. Hebertson felt that Ortiz' disability was a result of
his two automobile accidents and not his previous industrial
accident of February 19, 1976.

(R. at 459.) Although Dr.

Hebertson speculated that "[i]t would probably have been
necessary for [Ortiz] to retire at some point . . . ," Dr.
Hebertson candidly acknowledges that the automobile accidents
accelerated the process.

Because the Commission's findings of

fact cannot be based on mere speculation (IGA Food Fair v.
Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978)), and the Medical Panel
clearly concluded that no additional industrial disability had
occurred, Judge Allen determined that:
-12-

The preponderance of the medical evidence on the file
supports the finding of the medical panel that the
applicant's current disability is not due to the
industrial accident of February 19, 1976.

Emilio R. Ortiz is not currently disabled as a result
of the industrial accident of February 19, 1976.
(R. at 459.)
On review, the Industrial Commission Ialso considered the
evidence and opinions offered by Dr. Hebertson.

The Commission

noted that "there is insufficient contradiction" between the
reports of the medical panel and Dr. Hebertson "to warrant a
cross-examination of the medical panel."

(R. at 473.)

Both reports strongly suggest that any increased
impairment results from injuries the(applicant
received in two significant non-industrial automobile
accidents occurring in 1983. The facts indicate the
applicant worked after initially recovering from his
1976 industrial accident up until the first 1983
automobile accident. The only statement that even
suggests permanent total disability resulting from the
1976 industrial accident is the very speculative
statement of Dr. Hebertson quoted above . . . .
(R. at 473-74.)

In contrast to the speculative opinions of Dr.

Hebertson the medical panel unequivocally stated "we do not
believe that his automobile accidents have any relation to his
industrial injury nor do we feel that hisj industrial disability
has increased in the past seven years."

(R. at 473.)

Because of the limited and speculative nature of Dr
Hebertson's evidence and the direct posit ion taken by the

medical panel, the Commission's decision, that any current
disability suffered by Ortiz did not result from the industrial
accident is supported by substantial evidence.
B.

The Industrial Commission Properly Concluded that
Ortiz' Current Disability did not Result From any
Industrial Accident.

In the instant case, the evidence supporting the Commission's finding that Ortiz' industrial disability has not
increased in seven years is both substantial and abundant.
With the exception of speculative statements by Dr. Hebertson,
it is conclusive.
Ortiz has suffered serious back problems since 1951, when
he fell in a shower injuring his back and neck.
34-35.)

(R. at

In 1957 Ortiz' automobile hit a deer causing another

low back injury.

(R. at 36.)

In 1957, Ortiz also suffered a

sprained back while digging at his home.

(R. at 37.)

In 1958

Ortiz suffered an acute lumbar sacral strain.

(R. at 37.)

In

1961, Ortiz again suffered back difficulties.

He also received

medical treatment for back injuries from a slip-and-fall
accident.

(R. at 37.)

In 1966, Ortiz again injured his back

while removing a car from a snow bank.

(R. at 38-39.)

Ortiz

candidly admits that he has suffered backaches resulting from
that type of exertion on many occasions.

(R. at 39.) Ortiz

also admitted that he injured his back while lifting a tool box
at home.

Id.
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In 1969, Ortiz slipped and fell agaih injuring his back
(R. at 39.)

In 1970, while a pedestrian^ Ortiz was hit by an

automobile.

(R. 21-22.)

In 1975, Ortiz was again involved in

an automobile accident in which another Motorist bacKed out of
a driveway and hit Ortiz' car, re-injuring his back.

(R. at

22-23.)

Later in the fall of 1975, Orti^; again suffered a back

injury.

(R. at 23.)

Following the 1976 accident and a 1978 surgery, Ortiz
returned to work on May 7, 1979.

He continued working until

April 1983, when he was involved in an automobile accident in
which his back was seriously injured.

(#. at 250-56 and 418.)

As a result of the April, 1983 accident, Ortiz was hospitalized
and received medical treatment and therariy.

(R. at 251-52.)

Later, on May 20, 1983 Ortiz was involved in an additional
automobile accident in which a car behind him failed to stop,
rear-ending the vehicle in which he was driving.

Once again,

Ortiz was hospitalized and received medicjal treatment and therapy for his back injuries.

(R. at 253-56|.) After the 1983

automobile accidents, Ortiz did not return to work.

(R. at 232

and 264.) Ortiz admits that the reason hje stopped reporting to
work on April 7, 1983 was because of back injury sustained in
the car accidents.

Id.

Under these circumstances and given the "maximum deference"
given by this Court to facts determined by the Commission, it
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is clear that substantial evidence supports both the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission's conclusion
that Ortiz' current disability is not a result of any industrial accident, but rather relates directly to non-employment
injuries.

See Wilson, 735 P.2d at 405.
POINT II

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY DENIED
ORTIZ A DISCRETIONARY MEDICAL PANEL HEARING.
Ortiz contends that he is entitled to a hearing on his
objections to the Medical Panel Report.

(Ortiz Brief at pp.

9-11.) Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (Supp. 1987) provides in
pertinent part that:
If objections to such report are filed the Commission
may set the case for hearing to determine the facts
and issues involved, and at such hearing any party so
desiring may request the Commission to have the chairman of the medical panel present at the hearing for
examination and cross-examination. (Emphasis added.)
In 1982, Section 35-1-77 was amended, substituting the phrase
"the Commission may" for "it shall be the duty of the Commission to" in the sixth sentence relative to hearings on objections to medical panel reports.

The 1982 amendment makes a

hearing on objections to a medical panel report discretionary
with the Commission, properly placing the burden of resolving

-16-

conflicts in evidence upon the Commission and not upon the
medical panel.

See Price River Coal Co, v. Industrial

Commission, 731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1986).
In a one line unsupported contention)[ Ortiz argues that the
pre-1982 duty of the Commission to set a case for hearing when
there are objections to a medical panel report is applicable in
the instant case.

Ortiz bases his argument on the nebulous

theory that the 1982 amendment cannot be applied retrospectively because it is substantive rather than procedural.

Ortiz

does not provide any explanation or authority in support of his
contention.

Ortiz' argument is ill founded since the 1982

procedural amendment governs Ortiz' 1984 application for
permanent total disability and there is ijo substantial conflict
in the medical evidence,
A.

The 1982 Amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 Governs
The Instant Application For Worker's Compensation
Benefits.

Where an amendment to a statute changes only procedural law
by providing a different mode or form of procedure for enforcing already existing substantive rights, the amended statute
may be applied retrospectively to accrued or pending actions to
further the legislature's remedial purposje.

See Marshall v

Industrial Commission of Utah, 704 P.2d 581, 582-83 (Utah 1985)
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In State v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982), the Utah
Supreme Court held:
[Procedural statutes enacted subsequent to the
initiation of a suit which do not enlarge, eliminate,
or destroy vested or contractual rights apply not only
to future actions, but also to accrued and pending
actions as well. (Emphasis added.)
In this case, the 1982 amendment to Section 77 does not
enlarge, eliminate or destroy any of applicants' vested or
contractual rights.

The amendment merely changes the procedure

for enforcing existing rights to obtain workers' compensation
benefits.

The right to obtain a hearing is not destroyed; it

is merely made discretionary based upon important legislative
concerns to avoid unnecessary administrative hearings and to
expedite the process of determining workers' compensation
issues.
Application of the 1982 amendment is the only means of
properly facilitating recovery of existing rights, without
unduly and unnecessarily prolonging the administrative
proceedings.

As noted by the Commission,

Considering the facts, which logically point to the
1983 car accidents as causing any significant increase
in impairment, and considering the very limited disagreement between Dr. Hebertson and the medical panel,
and finally considering the fact the medical panel was
fully aware of Dr. Hebertson's conclusions when the
medical panel issued its report, the Commission feels
the Administrative Law Judge correctly denied a
hearing on objections to the medical panel report.
The purpose behind having medical panels is to assure
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there is an unbiased professional assessment of the
relevant medical issues. Cross-exam ^.nation of the
medical panel should be reserved for cases where
significant disagreement or lack of larity exists or
where it is clear the medical panel has not had the
benefit of some evidence or opinion relevant to the
medical issues involved. This case is not such a
case, and therefore, the Commission rinds no further
hearing is warranted.
(R. at 473.)
The hearing sought by Ortiz is merely an evidence
generating mechanism used by the Commission to resolve
"'significant disagreement" or "lack of clarity."

(R. at 473.)

In the instant case, there is no significant factual disagreement.

Thus, a hearing on objections to the Medical Panel

Report is nothing more than a simple remedial measure for
clarifying disputed issues.

The 1982 amendment relieves the

Commission of the burdensome obligation of conducting an
unnecessary hearing.
In Marshall v. Industrial Commission,! 704 P. 2d 581 (Utah
1985), the Utah Supreme Court held that the statute providing
for interest payments on past-due workers' compensation
benefits should be applied in an action in which the claimant
sought benefits for an injury sustained before passage of the
statute.

The Court reasoned that retroactive application of

the statute was appropriate because it wajs intended to remedy
the depreciation of the value of benefits resulting from
non-receipt.

Marshall, 704 P.2d at 583.
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The Court also noted

that the "legislature could only have intended this remedy to
apply to as broad a range of awards as possible."

Id.

Similarly, in the instant case, retroactive application of
the 1982 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 is appropriate
because the amendment is intended to remedy the burdensome task
of conducting unnecessary medical panel hearings by making such
hearings discretionary in cases where there are no substantial
conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.

Under such

circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court has declared that:
Those remedial statutes are applied retrospectively to
accrued or pending actions to further the legislatures' remedial purpose unless a contrary legislative intent is manifested.
Marshall, 704 P.2d at 582; see generally Pilcher v. State Dept.
of Soc. Serv., 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983); and State Dept.
of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982).
B.

No Hearing Was Necessary Because There is No
Substantial Conflict in the Evidence.

Although the conclusion of Dr. Herbertson differs from that
of the Medical Panel, the evidence on which those conclusions
are based is not in conflict:
However, looking at both Dr. Herbertson' s report as a
whole and the medical panel's report as a whole, the
Commission finds that there is insufficient contradiction between the two reports, regarding the ultimate
issue of permanent total disability or increased
impairment resulting from the industrial accident, to
warrant a cross-examination of the medical panel.
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(R. at 473.)

Ortiz' contention that he is entitled to perma-

nent total disability benefits is almost entirely based on the
speculative position taken by Dr. Herbertson that he thinks
Ortiz' "industrial condition would have gradually increased
leading to the patient's early retirement, even though he had
not been involved in the automobile accident in 1983."

Id.

Unfortunately the 1983 automobile accident did occur.

(R. at

474.) Any speculation otherwise is not lustification for a
hearing on objections to a medical report and cannot be the
basis for a finding of fact.

IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d

828, 830 (Utah 1978) (holding that "a finding of fact and
imposition of liability cannot properly l^e made on a mere
possibility.")
POINT III
BECAUSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CONCLUDED
THAT ORTIZ' PRESENT DISABILITY DID NOT
RESULT FROM AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT, THE
ODD-LOT DOCTRINE IS IRRELEVANT TO THIS
APPEAL.
In his brief, Ortiz argues that based upon the 'Odd-Lot
Doctrine', Ortiz should be awarded permanent total disability
benefits.

The Industrial Commission neve r reached the issue of

permanent total disability because it determined that there was
no present disability on the basis of the industrial accident
Thus, the question of the Odd-Lot Doctrinp is not properly
before this Court.
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In Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc., 622 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah
1980), the Utah Supreme Court noted that:
This Court has recognized the principle that a workman
may be found totally disabled if by reason of the
disability resulting from his [industrial] injury he
cannot perform work of the general character he was
performing when injured, or any other work which a
[person] of his capabilities may be able to do or to
learn to do . . . (Emphasis added.)
Unless a particular disability arises from an industrial
accident, there is no workers' compensation liability.
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 100 (1986).

See 1A.
For

example, an individual who suffers a disability as a result of
non-employment activities, such as an automobile accident,
cannot claim any disability under the Workers' Compensation
Act.

_Id.

It follows that the Odd-Lot Doctrine cannot be

properly considered for the purpose of establishing permanent
total disability unless disability results from an industrial
accident.
In this case, the Commission concluded that "Ortiz is not
currently disabled as a result of the industrial accident of
February 19, 1976."

(R. at 459.) Therefore, because Ortiz

failed to demonstrate any current disability resulting from an
industrial accident, it follows that he is not entitled to
compensation under the Act.

Thus, the Odd-Lot Doctrine cannot

be considered.
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CONCLUSION
Kennecott respectfully requests that the decision of the
Industrial Commission be affirmed in all respects.
DATED this 20th day of May, 1988.
SNOW, CHRIS'flENSEN & MARTINEAU

fLayrock
^arr
Attorneys for Defendant/
Respondent
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Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77
MEDICAL PANEL - DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY OF
COMMISSION TO REFER CASE - FINDINGS AND
REPORTS - OBJECTIONS TO REPORT
HEARING EXPENSES.
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury
by accident, or for death, arising out of or in the course
of employment, and where the employer or insurance carrier
denies liability, the commission may r^fer the medical
aspects of the case to a medical panel
commission and having the qualifications generally applicable to the medical panel set forth in Section 35-2-56,
The medical panel shall then make such
X-rays and perform such tests, including postmortem
examinations where authorized by the commission, as it
may determine and thereafter make a report in writing
to the commission in a form prescribed by the commission,
and also make such additional findings as the commission
may require. The commission shall promptly distribute
full copies of the report of the panel to the applicant,
the employer and the insurance carrier by registered
mail with return receipt requested. Within fifteen days
after such report is deposited in the tfnited States post
office, the applicant, the employer or
may file with the commission objection^ in writing thereto.
If no objections are so filed within such period, the
report shall be deemed admitted in evidence and the
commission may base its finding and decision on the report
of the panel, but shall not be bound by such report if
there is other substantial conflicting evidence in the
case which supports a contrary finding by the commission,
If objections to such report are filed the commission
may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and
issues involved, and at such hearing any party so desiring
may request the commission to have the chairman of the
medical panel present at the hearing fir examination
and cross-examination. For good cause shown the commission
may order other members of the panel, with or without the
chairman, to be present at the hearing for examination
and cross-examination. Upon such hearing the written report
of the panel may be received as an exhibit but shall
not be considered as evidence in the c^se except as far
as it is sustained by the testimony admitted. The expenses
of such study and report by the medical panel and of their
appearance before the commission shall be paid out of the
fund provided for by section 35-1-68.
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SANDY-COTTONWOOD ORTHOPEDICS

•v

tndy MedkaJ-Profestiofial iMg.
1434 East 9400 South, Suite 100
Sandy, Utah 84092
(801) 571-7061

IAMB L McENTIRE,fcCD-|EMCO
CORDON R. KIMiAlL, MO., PC.
DONALD A. SCHMOT, M.D., PC

January 28, iy86*

Cottonwood tyedkal Tower
' i50 East«5770 South, Suite 160
* , Mi|rr*y, U?h 84107
• •
<8C1) 26^5353

>

»»

Timothy C. Allen
Administrative Law Judge
Workman's Compensation Division
160 East 300 South
P 0 Box 45580
Salt Lake City, UT
84145-0580
RE:

Emilio R. Ortiz

Dear Judge Allen:
This letter is a medical panel report on Mr. Emilico Ortiz which your
commission has directed. The panel convened in my Murray office today
and Mr. Ortiz was present as well as Doctor Jacksqn Millett and myself.
Both Doctor Millett and I had ampule time to examijne the three inch thick
chart on Mr. Ortiz which you had forwarded to us. I am enclosing with
this letter a copy of my brief review of this fil^ to Doctor Millett for
whatsoever use you would think wise.
We have reviewed the multiple letters within the c|hart and specifically
note the contents of some of these. We note that (Doctor Hargreaves felt
the patient be retired from his heavy work but thalt he gave him a 0 rating
as far as any industrial permanent physical impairment
Doctor Millet and I have reviewed our previous re pbrts and note that we had
given him initially a 10% rating with 2% due to t hb industrial injury.
This rating was considerably less than the rating given by Doctor Wayne
Hebertson who felt that the patient had 15% disabi lity of his lower spine
with 10% due to the industrial injury.
We are also aware of the fact that the patient has had spinal fusion subsequent to our first panel hearing and yet no rupt iired discs were found and
yet a two level fusion was accomplished.
We were also aware of two industrial hearings, one dated September 23, 1977
with Joseph C. Folley, Administrative Law Judge, the second hearing on
September 11, 1978 with Richard G. Sumsion f Admi nistrative Law Judge.
Results of those meetings were to resolve the discrepancy between the testimony of Doctor Hebertson and the medical panel. It was felt by this panel
that the Administrative Law Judges reached a compromised decision and awarded
the patient a 5% disability rating due to the industrial injury and had
increased his total disability 25% from all causesL
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iimor,ny u. Alien
RE: Emilio R. Ortiz
January 28, 1986
Page 2

(Prior to that administrative law decision we had also torwarcied a second
report indicating that as result of this spinal fusion his total disability
had increased 20% but still felt that 2% was due to#tp£ ^.i^dvstlr^l'injiir^.)
o • •• • • •
I 2 2 • !
»• • • • •
•••
j
This panel also noted that Doctor Boyd Holbrook was aS/are Io£*o«ir* results tind
our reports and did not feel a need to change our opinion or our rating.
This panel is also aware of a seven page letter by Doctor Jeff Rohlfing which
was for the veteran's division but in that he felt the patient was disabled
but did not give him a precentage of disability.
With this back ground material reviewed but not described in detail we then
proceded to discuss the patient's history in person with Mr. Ortiz. He stated
that after his spinal fusion in 1978 he was unable to return to work for six
to seven month period, wore a corset during much of that time.
Eventually he was able to return to his work as a brakeman for Kennecott
Copper Corporation and continued in that capacity until April, 1983. During
that period his work was heavy and often he had to lift railroad ties or do
other heavy work required in his capacity. He also would experience the jarring
of the train across the union of the tracks.
He also, as you have stated, was involved in an auto accident on April 3, 1983.
He apparenlty nearly rolled his car into a ditch and actually had two or three
episodes all at once. He did not in fact roll the car but nearly did. He was
able to work a day or two and eventually sought Doctor Hebertson out who admitted
him, I think April 6, 1983, to St. Mark's Hospital. He had pain in his back
and'his knees and remained in the hospital about a week. The patient was treated
conservatively and was eventually discharged from the hospital.
The patient stated that even before that accident he felt his back bothered by
the jarring of the track and he was concerned about getting off a moving train
on irregular surfaces which might have rocks or ice or snow or rain on the ground.
A second accident occurred about May 22, 1983 when his vehicle was rear-ended
when he was stopped to avoid a car in front of him. The patient eventually
required hospitalization beginning about May 27th and remained in the hospital
about a week. He states that as a result of these two accidents that there is
no litigation involved. The first accident was involving only himself and the
second accident involves an offending party who has no insurance.
The patient stated that he had pain down his legs and that he just has more of
the same since these two accidents and is more painful.
He states that he can not carry or lift, has to walk very carefully, stop on
occasion, difficulty swimming and symptoms increased with Valsalva function,
etc. He has used Rela, Darvon and Demoral which have helped him somewhat. He
is also receiving physical therapy three times a week from Robert Green.
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He states that aside from the previous noted problems rW has pain with coitus,
since surgery, and has increased pain at nighttime.
••

••

•• ••

Regarding his cervical spine he states it has not b^eq aggjr^v^tedfctj£L1 6y
the accident, but he still has some headaches, son|e ;t.tnnltji^«£ad*sb«e Jnumtness
in the left 4th and 5th fingers.
We asked the patient why he did not return to work and he stated that he could
not do the job and implied that he might get killed since he would have to
land off a moving train onto regular pavement.
His
current activities involve walking, helping his wife somewhat around the
house. He does not do lawn mowing or snow shovel ing or carry the garbage,
Current domestic responsibilities include his wif and daughter age 15. He
has five other children who are married and not lijving at home.
The panel examined Mr. Ortiz on the date noted abdve and seemed to be well
muscled and have strong muscles about arms and le^s and spine as well.
Lumbar spine examination reveals that he could flex forward only about 30 to 40c
extend spine 5°, abduct 15°. Initial straight led raising tests could be performed only 30 to 40° in a sitting position but we were eventually able to
raise both legs to at least 70°, however the rightj leg caused more pain than
the left but it seemed like the endpoint w a s n o t relached at that point and only
his complaint of pain and not spasms which ought tlp be present.
Muscle power revealed normal dorsal and plantar flex:ion of his muscles and
right and left calf both measured 15^ inches. The patient's deep tendon reflexes revealed 2+ and equal knee jerks respectively and a 2+ right ankle jerk
and a 1+ left ankle jerk.
Examination of the cervical spine revealed that he could flex 45°, extend 30°,
rotate only 30° and abduct 20°. Again we were noj: convinced that this was the
actualy limit but only what he wanted us to see. In fact we noticed at other
times when he was not aware we were watching that he rotated his neck considerably more. He had some aching on the left side.
The patient is left handed and left biceps are 12 finches, right 11^ inches.
Both forearm masses were 11 inches.
Deep tendon reflexes revealed 2+ and equal biceps and triceps respectively.
Doctor Millet and I compared current films taken in my office consisting of a
three view lumbar spine and a five view cervical spine and revealed a solid
fusion at L4 to the sacrum with some narrowing at 5. There is slight degenerative arthritis at L4 anteriorally. As we c oi^ipared those current 1986
with films dated 1978 the only significant differ ence we could see is the
spinal fusion has matured significantly and no progression of his arthritis.
Films of the cervical spine were obtained which repealed some straightening
of the cervical spine and degenerative arthritis at C5-6. Perhaps slight
foraminal narrowing on the left side at C2-3, C3-4J C4-5.
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Comparing the disc space in the cervical spine is diffycylt to compare because
there is difference in magnification but general appearance reveals the arthritis is not progressed significantly.
• • • ••
••
• •
•
•••••••
•••••••
It is the opinion of this panel that this patient ha£ *fajlfcd; t£ deftojisfrrate
by objective physical findings or roentgenographs fiifdiflgS* ahy *sigftificant
progression of his disease since 1976 with exception of the spinal fusion
which has already been mentioned. We are aware that the industrial commission
has settled on a permanent physical impairment of 25% of the whole person and
attributed 5% of that to the industrial injury. It is this panel's opinion
that those determinations are unchanged by our examination. We specifically
have not in opinion increased his disability from 2 to 5% but are aware that
that has already occurred and feel that it has been no change from the determinations already made.
The panel further feels that the patient has not been temporarily or totally
disabled since May 6, 1979 when he returned to work. We do not believe that
his automobile accidents have any relation to his industrial injury nor do we
feel that his industrial disability has increased in thes past seven years.
Respectively submitted.
Sincerely,

^^L^C^d{ZZZ\H^
E. McEntire, M.D.
of the Medical Panel,

mb
llett, M.D.
JEM/mdl
Enclosures

P.S. The panel is aware that Doctor Hebertson felt that he had a 5% increased
disability over time but the panel does not concur with that. The panel is
also trying to determine if Doctor Hebertson himself made an error since he
had rated him about 30% disabled about seven years ago and still has him 30%
disabled but implies an additional 5% increase.
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

6'/

Case No. 84000914

EMILIO R. ORTIZ,
Applicant,
vs.
KENNECOTT COPPER CORP. (self
insured) and/or SECOND INJURY
FUND,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake city, Utah, on November 6,
1985, at 8:30 a.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission,

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by Susan B.
Diana, Attorney at Law.
The defendant, Kennecott, i^as represented by J. R.
Shields, Personnel Manager.
The Second Injury Fund wa^ represented by Erie V.
Boorman, Administrator.

At the conclusion of the Evidentiary Hearing, the matter was referred
to a medical panel appointed by the Administrative) Law Judge. The medical
panel report was received and copies were distributed to the parties. The
applicant, by and through counsel, filed objections to the medical panel
report and also requested a hearing. In reviewing Section 77 of the Act, as
amended, the Administrative Law Judge notes that that Section provides that
the Commission may schedule a hearing on the objections to a medical panel
report. It is the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that the amendment
to Section 77 was a procedural rather than substanitive amendment, and as such
the present provisions apply. Further, the Administrative Law Judge has not
been presented with any new medical evidence different than that which has
already been submitted by the applicant's treating physician, Dr. Wayne
Hebertson.
The medical panel has been fully apprised of the treating
physician's views in the matter, and no legitimate purpose would be served by
prolonging the proceedings. Rather, this case involves the classic situation
where reasonable medical minds can and do differ. Further medical testimony
would not provide any more assistance to the Administrative Law Judge in
resolving the matter. Having thoroughly reviewed the matter and the medical

r-i

U

\j

v

-1

-

EMILIO ORTIZ
ORDER
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panel report in this matter, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the
objections to the medical panel report should be rejected and the medical
panel report is hereby admitted into evidence.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
Emilio Ortiz sustained a compensable industrial accident on February
19, 1976 while working for Kennecott. At that time, he was lifting a 8 foot
by 1 foot square railroad tie, weighing in excess of 100 pounds, when he
experienced a sudden onset of back difficulties. He eventually required a
back fusion in September of 1978. Following an evidentiary hearing and a
hearing on objections to the medical panel report, the Commission entered its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order finding that the applicant had
sustained a 5% permanent partial impairment due to the industrial accident of
February 19, 1976, and an additional 10% impairment due to pre-existing lumbar
problems, and an additional 10% due to pre-existing cervical problems, for a
total award of 25% of the whole person. These benefits were awarded and paid
to the applicant.
On or about May 7, 1979 the applicant returned to work at-Kennecott
after receiving his lumbar fusion from Dr. Boyd Holbrook on September 27,
1978. The applicant testified that when he returned to work he was still
having back pain and the doctor instructed him not to lift or bend. The
applicants job as a brakeman involved heavy work, since there was no light
work available. The applicant continued to work since he had a family to
support. The applicant testified that following his injury but prior to April
1 of 1983, he was getting worse and he was unable to jump off trains anymore.
The applicant was receiving treatment from Dr. Hargreaves and Dr. Hebertson,
which consisted of physical therapy, which was prescribed by both of the
doctors, and he was also taking muscle relaxers which had been given to him by
Dr. Hebertson.
On April 3, 1983 Mr. Ortiz was on his way to work when he hit some
black ice before he arrived at Copperton. His car spun three or four times
and he eventually landed in a ditch. As a result, he had pain in his head,
neck, and low back. He also had a worsening of leg pain after this accident.
He was seen by Dr. Hebertson on April 6, 1983 and at that time the doctor made
arrangements to hospitalize him, which was accomplished on April 10, 1983.
The applicant received an x-ray, CT scan, EKG, and EEG along with bed rest
while in the hospital. He was subsequently discharged on April 15, 1983. The
applicant started losing time from Kennecott on April 3, 1983 and has not
worked since.
On May 20, 1983 the applicant was southbound on 200 South in his
automobile, when a car ahead stopped which forced him to stop also. The car
behind him did not see the applicant stopped, and so he rear-ended him,
although the applicant stated that the car was not going very fast. The
applicant had a lot of pain in his back again and had worsening of leg pain.
He was hospitalized on May 27, 1983 at the St. Mark's Hospital by Dr.
Hebertson, and was given physical therapy, x-rays and bed rest.

EMILIO ORTIZ
ORDER
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On March 30, 198A the applicant was examined by Dr. Hargreaves, since
disability basis. Dr.
he had requested retirement from Kennecott on
Hargreaves indicates in his notes that the applicant was complaining of being
unable to climb trains any more, and the doctor found that the applicant was
100% disabled from performing his job at Kennecott but that his current
disability was not due to the industrial injury of February 19, 1976. Rather,
Dr. Hargreaves found that the applicant's problems had dated back to the
1950fs, and that he had a progressive degenerative process. Dr. Hargreaves
also found that the automobile accident of April 3 J 1983 constituted an acute
as did the automobile
aggravation of the applicant's low back problems
accident of May 20, 1983. The applicant also indicated on cross-examination
that he had lost consciousness as a result of the April 3, 1983 accident.
With respect to prior problems, the applicant served in the Army in 1950 and
1951 as an MP. The applicant fell in a shower, and hurt his neck and lumbar
back, and as a result was given a medical discharge
The applicant's present complaints are that he has constant pain in
his back and legs and that he is unable to climb a ladder and that he has
fallen twice while doing so. He also has pain in his knees from a hit and run
accident he sustained in 1970, and he also complains that his right little and
ring fingers are numb. The applicant also complains that he has headaches,
which Dr. Hargreaves noted that started after his automobile accident of May
20, 1983. The applicant also stated that walking causes knee and back pain,
and that he can sit for one or two hours before he must get up and move around.
With the file in this posture, the case Was referred to a medical
panel for the purpose of determining if there had been any increase in the
permanent partial impairment due to the industrial injury of February 19, 1976
beyond the 5% already awarded and paid. In addition, the panel was also asked
if there had been any temporary total disability since May 6, 1979, the date
to which the applicant had already been compensated, as a result of the
industrial accident of February 19, 1976. The medical panel answered both of
the inquiries in the negative. The panel was of thd opinion that there was no
objective physical findings or x-ray findings of any significant progression
of the applicant's disease since the performance of his spinal fusion in
1978. The panel concluded that the applicant has not been temporarily and
totally disabled since May 6, 1979 as a result of the industrial accident, and
that his impairment due to the industrial injury has
has already been awarded. The Administrative Law Jupge adopts the findings of
the medical panel as his own.
In adopting the findings of the medical pan^ 1, the Administrative Law
Judge is mindful of the evidence and opinions of Dr. Hebertson.
The
Administrative Law Judge feels the need to comment on some of that evidence.
Specifically, the letter of May 31, 1984. At that time, Dr. Hebertson stated
as follows:
Mr. Ortiz1 current disability dates from the accident of April
6, 1983. He had not been able to wc^rk since that time. The
condition was further aggravated by the accident of May 20,
C-3
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1983. Both accidents were superimposed on a prior industrial
accident in 1976. I think his original industrial condition was
gradually getting worse. It would probably have been necessary
for him to retire at some point, but the accident of last Spring
did speed up this process.
From the foregoing, it is clear to the Administrative Law Judge that
the applicant'5 treating physician, Dr. Hebertson felt that the applicant's
current disability was a result of his two automobile accidents and not his
industrial accident of February 19, 1976. The doctor acknowledges that the
automobile accidents speeded up the applicant's condition.
The doctor
indicates that it probably would have been necessary for him to retire at some
point due to the industrial injury, but the doctor begs the question in this
regard. Because by the same token, it is just as probable that the applicant
would not have been required to retire. Be that as it may, the Administrative
Law Judge finds that the preponderance of the medical evidence on the file
supports the finding of the medical panel that the applicant's current
disability is not due to the industrial accident of February 19, 1976.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

i*

-

Emilio R. Ortiz is not currently
industrial accident of February 19, 1976.

disabled

as a result

of

the

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Emilio R. Ortiz for
permanent total disability benefits as a result of his industrial accident of
February 19f 1976 while employed by Kennecott should be, and the same is
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections and unless so filed
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Passed by the Industrial Commissi©
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, t
SV^t
day of March, 1986•
ATTEST:

Linda J. Strasburg, Commission Secretary
r.-A

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on March
, 1986 a copy of the attached ORDER
in the case of Emilio Ortiz issued March Q^\ wajs mailed to the following
persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Emilio Ortiz
143 North 700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Suzan B, Diana
Attorney at Law
261 East Broadway Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
J.R. Shields
Kennecott
P.O. Box 31838
Salt Lake City, Utah 84131
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By
Sherry
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No*

EMILIO R. ORTIZ,

*
*

DENIAL OF

Applicant,
*
*
*

vs.

MOTION FOR
REVIEW

KBNNECOTT COPPER CORP.
(SELF-INSURED) and
SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
* *

On March 24, 1986, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying the applicant in
the above-captioned case permanent total disabilit;y and further permanent
partial impairment benefits.
The Administrative Law Judge adopted the
findings of the medical "panel that the applicant's impairment had not
increased beyond the 25% whole person rating that was assessed in 1980. The
Administrative Law Judge disallowed the counsel for the applicant's request
for a hearing on objections to the medical panel report. The Administrative
Law Judge concluded that it was within his discretion whether or not to
conduct a hearing on objections to the medical panel report, and the
Administrative Law Judge determined no hearing was warranted as the medical
panel had all the medical evidence before it when ii rendered its decision.
On April 18, 1986, the counsel for the applicant filed a Motion for Review
contesting the Administrative Law Judge*s refusal to allow a hearing on
objections to the medical panel report. The counsel tor the applicant stated
that, considering the fact the applicant's treating pnysician found increased
impairment and possibly permanent total disability resulting from the 1976
industrial accident, cross-examination of the medical (panel was warranted and
necessary to test the reliability of the medical panel conclusions. The
Commission is of the opinion that cross-examination pf the medical panel in
this case is not justifiable.
The counsel for the applicant points to the treating physician's
conclusions as being supportive of a finding of permanent total disability or
at least supportive of a finding of increased impairment. The counsel for the
applicant concludes that this different conclusion from that of the medical
panel warrants a cross-examination of the medical panel to ascertain the
panel's basis for their decision. The Commission agrees that the treating
physician's conclusions and those of the medical panel are somewhat at odds,
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but the Commission does not find the two conclusions totally contradictory.
Dr. Hebertson, the treating physician, does seem to suggest that permanent
total disability could possibly have occurred as a result of the 1976
industrial accident. He states "I also think that the industrial condition
would have gradually increased leading to the patient*s early retirement, even
though he had not been involved in the automobile accident in 1983/* However,
this statement is rather speculative, and comes after a more lengthly
discussion of how two non-industrial 1983 car accidents contributed to the
applicant's impaired condition. The Commission does not find this statement
to be a clear conclusion on the part of Dr. Hebertson that the applicant was
permanently totally disabled as result of the 1976 industrial accident.
Looking at the medical panel report, the medical panel concludes, "We
do not believe that his automobile accidents have any relation to his
industrial injury nor do we feel that his industrial disability has increased
in the past seven years/* This statement more clearly rules out increased
impairment or permanent total disability resulting from the industrial
accident than does Dr. Hebertson*s report. However, looking at both Dr.
Hebertson*s report as a whole and the medical panel's report as a whole, the
Commission finds that there is insufficient contradiction between the two
reports, regarding the ultimate issue of permanent total disability or
increased impairment resulting from the industrial accident, to warrant a
cross-examination of the medical panel. Both reports strongly suggest that
any increased impairment results from injuries the applicant received in two
significant non-industrial automobile accidents occurring in 1983. The facts
indicate the applicant worked after initially recovering from his 1976
industrial accident up until the first 1983 automobile accident. The only
statement that even suggests permanent total disability resulting from the
1976 industrial accident is the very speculative statement of Dr. Hebertson
quoted above, and Dr. Hebertson and the medical panel differ only 5% in what
increase in impairment occurred before the 1983 car accident.
Considering the facts, which logically point to the 1983 car
accidents as causing any significant increase in impairment, and considering
the very limited disagreement between Dr. Hebertson and the medical panel, and
finally considering the fact the medical panel was fully aware of Dr.
Hebertson's conclusions when the medical panel issued its report, the
Commission feels the Administrative Law Judge correctly denied a hearing on
objections to the medical panel report. The purpose behind having medical
panels is to assure there is an unbiased professional assessment of the
relevant medical issues. Cross-examination of the medical panel should be
reserved for cases where significant disagreement or lack of clarity exists or
where it is clear the medical panel has not had the benefit of some evidence
or opinion relevant to the medical issues involved. This case is not such a
case, and therefore, the Commission finds no further hearing is warranted.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's April 18, 1986 Motion
for Review is hereby denied and the Administrative Law Judge's March 24, 1986
Order is hereby affirmed.

Lenice L, Nielsen, Commissioner

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
/f**
day of June 1986.
ATTEST:
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